This paper studies the inflationary implications of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary union.
Introduction
This paper studies the inflationary implications of regional debt in a monetary union. A priori there should be no effects of regional debt on inflation, as this debt is an obligation of the region and not the whole union.
Yet, both in theory and in practice it appears that determining who bears the regional tax obligation is more subtle: central banks may monetize regional debt thus substituting the inflation tax for regional taxation.
The point of this paper is to develop a framework to determine the conditions under which regional debt is monetized by the central bank. Using this model, we discuss how existing institutions confront these issues in practice.
Recent experiences within the European Monetary Union and Argentina highlight the complex interactions between regional fiscal authorities and the central bank within a monetary union. Within the EMU, measures to constrain fiscal policy at the national level were discussed early on. As the EU's fiscal policy is only marginal, the European Central Bank (ECB) is the sole "supra-national" authority in the EMU facing the national governments of the EMU and their fiscal policies. The issue then is how the ECB will respond, if at all, to these national deficits.
The institutional framework of the EMU addressed this concern in two stages. The initial step was Article 104c of the Maastricht treaty which prohibits excessive deficits by Member States of the European Union.
The looseness of the excessive deficits procedure triggered an intense debate within the EMU. An initiative of the German government to reinforce this procedure lead to the adoption of a "Stability and Growth Pact" (hereafter, the SGP). The SGP has been incorporated in various provision of the Amsterdam treaty, adopted by the EU's countries in 1997. It had three main features. First, a detailed definition of excessive deficits was adopted. Second, the European Commission was given the role of a watchdog on national fiscal policies.
Third, detailed penalties were designed in case of excessive deficits with the objective that the deviating country be induced to quickly adopt corrective fiscal measures. The turmoil surrounding the SGP highlights two points. First, it indicates the concern over the consequences of regional fiscal affairs on monetary policy. Second, it makes clear that designing and implementing enforceable regulations of regional deficits and debts is not an easy matter.
This issue is not restricted to monetary unions formed by a coalition of sovereign countries like the EMU.
It also applies to monetary unions formed of regions (states) in which monetary policy is centralized and various fiscal authorities coexist, at different levels of governments. Countries, such as Argentina and the U.S., fit this description.
The experience in Argentina starting in the 1990s represents an extreme but vivid example of the inflationary effects of regional fiscal deficits. Here, during a few years, regional bonds were not just monetized into pesos, the Argentine currency, they circulated as currencies within the Argentine federation. The province of Buenos Aires circulated about 1.8 billion pesos of interest bearing provincial bonds starting in July 2001, at the end of the currency board regime in Argentina. The notes comprising this debt, called Patacones, were of small denomination and had almost the same size and a design quite similar to the Argentine peso notes. The initial issue of Patacones were paid-off with interest in July 2002. At that time, about 2.65 billion pesos of new regional debt was issued with a maturity of November 13, 2006 . Interestingly, the province announced that taxes could be paid with this debt, evidently at face value. In addition, the federal government issued 3.3 billion pesos of small denomination bonds called Lecops. Other provinces have also issued small denomination bonds. 3 These "quasi-monies" have been redeemed by the Argentine federal Government after the accession to power of President Kirchner. 4 These experiences in Europe and Argentina reflect the interplay between the fiscal authorities and the central bank within a monetary union, and the possibility that the central bank be pressured to monetize the deficits. Thus, we are interested in addressing the following questions:
the Regulations 1466/97 and 1467/97. According to these texts, national deficits should be analyzed with a medium-term perspective; the assessment of excessive deficits should take into consideration the level of debts and "structural reforms", including the reform of the pension system; finally, the corrective phase in case of excessive deficits may be extended in case of negative external circumstances. These various provisions correspond to a much watered-down pact. • Does the circulation of debt by a regional government lead to the creation of money by the central bank and thus inflation?
• Or, does the issuance of such debt lead to future taxation without any money creation and thus without any inflation?
• What types of government interventions, such as limitations on regional debt, are required?
From a positive perspective, addressing the first two questions provides insight into the inflationary implications of regional debt, and answers the question posed in the title. The analysis also allows us to evaluate various forms of intervention which have been proposed to limit the temptation to run excessive deficits. Our theory is therefore helpful in assessing the ongoing debate over the excessive deficits in countries belonging to the EMU. 5 We address these questions in an abstract model of a monetary union where one regional government issues bonds to finance transfers to its citizens. We show the existence of two types of equilibria: one in which regional debt is backed by regional taxation and another in which regional debt is financed by an inflation tax. 6 This multiplicity reflects a commitment problem of the central bank. We thus argue that the inflationary effects of regional debt must be determined by the interactions of the market participants and cannot be ascertained a priori. From this perspective, policy interventions may be useful to coordinate on a socially preferred outcome.
A Monetary Economy with Regional Debt
We construct an overlapping generations model of a monetary union to study the interactions of agents and their governments across regions. The section describes the basic environment, with particular attention to the interactions of the governments. We also discuss the optimization problems of the agents and the constraints of the governments.
Environment
The economy is composed of two regions, indexed i=1,2. There are N i agents in region i and total population is given by N = N i . As the equilibria will depend on the fraction of agents in region 1, we define ∆ ≡ N1 N . 5 Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) provided a theoretical justification of the SGP based on myopic behavior by national governments.
Here we develop a perspective based on perfect rational behavior by the various policymakers. 6 These results are the monetary analogues of those reported in Cooper, Kempf and Peled (2005) in the discussion of "consumption smoothing".
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Agents live for two periods, consuming the single consumption good in each period. Lifetime utility is given by u(c y ) + v(c o ). Both u(·) and v(·) are strictly increasing and strictly concave. All agents are endowed with ω y units of the consumption good in youth and ω o in old age. Agents have access to a storage technology that yields x > 1 units of the consumption good in period t + 1 for each unit stored in period t. In addition, agents may save by holding debt issued by the region 1 government. Finally, there is a legal restriction that requires money to be held in proportion to the level of real storage, as in Smith (1994) . One interpretation is that access to the storage technology requires an intermediary which must hold money as a reserve requirement. 7 Each agent is born in one of the two regions and mobility between regions is ruled out. A fraction of the agents live in region 1, which is fiscally active and issues regional debt. Our focus is on the question of who pays this regional obligation. There is a second group of agents living in region 2, whose government does not issue debt. 8 Nonetheless region 2 agents are important as their welfare is reflected in the decisions of the central bank, denoted CB.
In any period, two levels of government are active: the government of region 1, denoted RG, and the
CB.
There is a sequence of regional governments maximizing the lifetime utility of each generation. 9 The RG representing generation t makes a real transfer to region 1 agents in period t, sells its debt and can levy a lump-sum tax on region 1 agents in period t + 1. The CB can print money to bailout the debt obligation of the region 1 government. These governments have different objectives: the region 1 government is only concerned with the welfare of its citizens while the CB considers the welfare of all agents living in the union.
Formally, we consider a extensive form game, played each period, with the following sequence of choices:
• the region 1 government representing the current old either;
-raises taxes to fully pay its obligation (pay) or -chooses not to raise taxes (no pay) and passes the debt obligation to the CB;
• if the region 1 government chooses (no pay), the CB either pays the obligation, financed by printing money, or denies it; 7 We are grateful to Todd Keister for discussions on this point. Alternatively, we could assume there is a reserve requirement on all savings, including the holding of government debt. If we assume that the regional bond has a small nominal value, as is the cases with patacones, there is no need for it to be intermediated and thus no basis for a reserve requirement. 8 In the context of Argentina, region 1 is intended to represent the province of Buenos Aires and region 2 representing the citizens outside of this region. This simplification clearly misses the fact that other regions have also issued small denomination debt. But the province of Buenos Aires accounts for about 60 % of the regional debt outstanding. 9 In fact, this choice of ob jectives is without loss of generality since a regional government in period t has no influence over any state variables that matter for future generations.
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• if the CB denies the obligation, then the region defaults and its citizens suffer a fixed default cost of κ.
This game is played in period t + 1 by the regional government representing region 1, generation t old agents. Importantly, the taxation decisions associated with generation t agents are made in period t + 1, after savings decisions have been made by that generation.
We focus on steady state equilibria of this economy. Each young agent of generation t born in region 1 receives a real transfer of g, given exogenously, from the region government 1 and that government sells debt of B per capita. 10 We construct two types of steady states for this economy. In one equilibrium, which we term Ricardian, agents in a region who receive a transfer from their regional government save in anticipation of future taxes.
As the regional debt is held largely by agents of that region in this equilibrium, the central bank will not bailout the region but instead allow it to default. Anticipating this, the regional government will prefer to tax its own citizens to repay the debt. So the circulation of these regional bonds does not lead to any money creation.
In a second equilibrium, which we term Monetization, all agents union-wide anticipate a bail-out by the central bank. Thus they all hold money and the debt issued by a region and, given this distribution of debt holdings, the central bank will choose to monetize the debt. Anticipating this, the regional government will not raise taxes to pay its debt but will choose to turn the obligation over to the central bank. 11 Here the circulation of regional bonds is analogous to money creation by the central bank. This monetization of its debt will lead a region to run excessive deficits since the burden of the debt is shared by all regions.
The co-existence of these equilibria reflects the commitment problem faced by the CB. In the extensive form game, the objective of the CB is the sum of the weighted utilities of all old agents. Accordingly, it is ultimately interested in equalizing the real consumptions of these agents. Whether or not it allows default on the debt depends on the holdings of this debt across agents. In the monetization equilibrium, the debt is widely held and allowing default is undesirable due to the default cost. But, if the debt is held by region 1 agents, then allowing default by the CB leads to more equitable consumption. This supports a decision to tax by the regional government and thus a Ricardian equilibrium. 
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A key distinguishing feature across the two equilibria is whether the debt is widely held in the economy or concentrated with agents in the bond-issuing region. In the former case, there is a bail-out as the central bank will pay-off the regional debt. Knowing this, the regional government does not meet its obligation. In the latter case, the effects of the default are isolated as the agents in the bond-issuing region are, in effect, defaulting on themselves. Consequently, the central bank will allow default rather than pay the obligation of the region. Anticipating this, the regional government will prefer to tax its citizens and a Ricardian equilibrium arises. In all cases individuals are indifferent with regards to the composition of their portfolios:
it is the aggregate distribution of holdings which is key to the equilibrium outcome. Despite this indifference at the level of the individual, the outcomes in the two equilibria may be quite different.
Individual Optimization
We begin with the generic optimization problem of a representative young agent in region i = 1, 2. The problem is later refined depending on the type of equilibrium and the region of the agent.
The representative agent solves
where g i is the real transfer to each region i young agent and τ i is the tax paid in old age. Since only region 1 is fiscally active: g 1 = g and g 2 = τ 2 = 0. The magnitude of τ 1 will be determined in equilibrium.
There are three types of savings: k i is real storage with return x, b i is the holding of real debt with a real return of R and m i is the holding of real money. We impose a legal restriction that a fraction (λ) of capital must be held as money, so that required real money balances are: m i ≥ λk i . This restriction generates a demand for money. The real return on the holding of money,π, is the inverse of (one plus) the inflation rate.
Along the equilibrium path, the inflation rate is anticipated by young agents.
Since the return on holding of money will, in equilibrium, be less than the return on storage, the reserve requirement binds: m i = λk i . Thus the return on storage, given the reserve requirement, is x+λπ 1+λ per unit placed in storage. 12 In equilibrium, this must be the same as the return on regional debt, R.
With this in mind, (1) simplifies to
where s i ≡ k i (1+λ)+b i represents total saving and R = x+λπ 1+λ . The optimal savings decision, which depends on R, is denoted by s i * (R), and satisfies
1 2 Put differently, it costs 1 + λ units of consumption today to get x + λπ units of consumption tomorrow.
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We assume throughout that w y is sufficiently large relative to w o implying s i is strictly positive. Further, in the equilibria we construct, the constraint that k i ≥ 0 does not bind.
Regional Government's Objectives and Constraints
The regional government representing a generation of region 1 agents faces two budget constraints. The first relates the transfer to young agents to the debt issued by the regional government:
where ∆ is the population size of region 1.
13
When the agents are old, the regional government, will have to repay it debt obligations. Letting R be the return on debt (determined in equilibrium), the second budget constraint of the regional government is:
Here unprimed variables are current ones and primed ones are future variables. So, for any generation, M is the current money supply, M ′ is the future stock of money and M ′ − M is the transfer of newly printed money from the CB to RG. Likewise, p is the current prices of goods in terms of money and p ′ is the future price. 14 Thus, the first term,
, is the real value of the money transfers. The second term is the revenue created by taxing the old. These two sources of revenue must be enough to cover the outstanding obligations of the region 1 government, RB.
The period t regional government represents generation t old agents in period t + 1. Its objective is to maximize the consumption and thus the utility of these old agents. Using (2), this consumption is
The policies of the regional government influence the consumption in old-age of region 1 agents directly through the tax, τ 1 , and indirectly by influencing monetary policy and thus R. Both τ 1 and R are determined in equilibrium.
The Central Bank
The policy of the CB is to choose whether to monetize the debt of region 1. If the CB chooses to bailout the regional government then it will print enough money to cover its obligations. The newly printed money is transferred directly to the RG and thus appears on the left side of (5).
The CB maximizes the utility of old agents in both regions. 15 Its objective is assumed to be:
Through its decision to bailout the regional government, the CB influences the tax paid by old agents, τ 1 , as well as the return on saving R. In equilibrium, the CB will also affect the saving decision of forward-looking agents in both regions. 16 
Equilibria
This section constructs two types of equilibria. In one, the CB prints money and transfers it to the regional 1 government. In the other, there are no transfers and the regional government levies taxes on old agents to pay its debt.
Equilibrium with Monetization
Here we construct a stationary equilibrium in which the CB monetizes the regional obligation rather than allowing default. The agents anticipate this and adjust their saving accordingly. The region chooses no pay, sets its tax rate to zero and sends the obligation to the CB. In equilibrium, the CB prefers monetization over default: regional debt is inflationary.
This equilibrium is comprised of a vector of choices by agents in each region and a rate of return on money: (k 1 * , s 1 * , k 2 * , s 2 * ,π * ). Along the equilibrium path, given the constant level of government debt B * , there will be constant growth of the money supply, constant inflation and thus a constant real return on money,π * . This gets factored into the return on savings so that R * = x+λπ * 1+λ is the return on savings along the equilibrium path and determines s i * . As storage and regional debt have the same return, we can freely construct agents' portfolios as part of the equilibrium. We focus on steady state equilibria where all young agents of region 1 hold a fraction θ of the outstanding debt:
∆ . The rate of inflation is determined from market clearing and the activity of the central bank. Using (5), monetization of the debt B by the central bank implies
1 5 We argue below that the power of the CB is limited to affecting only consumptions levels in old age of the present generation. 1 6 Though, as explained below, the CB decides upon its policy given (s 1 , s 2 ).
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A monetary equilibrium requires that the supply of real money balances (by both old agents and the CB) equals the demand by the young who have to meet their reserve requirement. So market clearing implies
represents total storage. Using (8) in (7) yields
whereπ = p p ′ . In characterizing the individual decisions and market clearing, we have assumed an equilibrium with CB monetization. So we write (3) with τ 1 = 0 and all financing is through money creation, as in (7). We need to check that this is an equilibrium by evaluating the incentives of the regional government and the central bank. The following intuition underlies the proof of Proposition 1.
First, consider the incentives of the CB. Its choice about monetizing the regional debt influences the current nominal money supply and thus may redistribute purchasing power across old agents. But this choice has no effect on future generations since the inherited stock of fiat money is completely neutral. 17 So the CB looks only at the welfare of the current old. If it chooses a bail-out, then social welfare, W b , is given by
in the steady state. If the CB allows default, then the welfare of the current old is given by
since, under default, there is no return on the holding of government debt and no inflation for this generation of old agents. Importantly, we are considering a one-time deviation from a candidate equilibrium. The existence proof relies on two equilibrium conditions: (10) and R(π) = x+λπ 1+λ . Substitution of R(π) into (10) yields:
Herek(π) reflects the dependence of aggregate savings and thus aggregate storage (given B * ) on R(π).
Denote the left-side of (13) , there will exist a π which solves (13) . We assume endowments such that there is positive saving atπ = 0. Hence for B * sufficiently low, H(0) > G(0) and so there will exist a value ofπ, denotedπ * , solving (13) . Givenπ * , R * is determined and thus so are total saving and storage. This proof holds for θ ≤ ∆.
To see the incentive of the CB to monetize, use (10) and b 1 * = B * θ ∆ to write the consumption of old agents under monetization as
Write the consumption of old agents in region i under default as
From these expressions, total consumption available to all agents in a given period is independent of whether the CB chooses to bailout the region or allow a default. That is,
under both default and bail-out. Thus, if consumption allocations under the bail-out were more equal than they are under default, (we show that in both cases region 1 old agents have higher consumption), then the CB would choose bail-out.
In the monetization steady state, there is no regional taxation: τ 1 = 0. Since only region 1 has transfers, and the CB will prefer to monetize rather than allow default. In fact, the CB prefer total monetization since this allows it to obtain the most equal consumption allocation.
Finally, we inspect the incentives of the region 1 government. Letĉ o1 denote the consumption of region 1 agents in the event that the region 1 government taxes the consumption of these agents at a rate of τ 1 .
From the budget constraint of the regional 1 government, ∆τ 1 = B * R * . Using this constraint to determine taxes,ĉ
Note that in this expression the savings choices of the private agents are (k 1 * , b 1 * ) since this proposed deviation from the equilibrium occurs after private agents choose their savings.
There are two differences between this and old consumption in the steady state, given in (14) . First, the inflation is zero and second there is a tax to be paid. The difference between c o1 * andĉ o1 is
Thus the regional government prefers to allow the CB to monetize the debt rather than tax its agents directly.
This result indicates the obligations of the regional government will be assumed by the CB. As a consequence, the regional transfers are financed by an economy-wide inflation tax, partially borne by agents in region 2.
Interestingly, the redistribution in the bail-out is from agents in region 1 to those in region 2. With θ ≤ ∆, the young of region 1 have more storage and thus hold more money. As a consequence, the region 1 agents bear more of the inflation tax. Still, the bail-out is preferred by region 1 agents to their full payment of taxes.
Ricardian Equilibrium
Here we characterize a second equilibrium in which the regional government prefers to tax its agents. In this equilibrium the CB, given the opportunity to act, would not choose to monetize. Rather it would allow default. In anticipation of this, the region will tax. Given this, the agents in region 1 save more and 13
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thus pay taxes from this extra savings. In the equilibrium this extra savings is in the form of holding of debt. Therefore only region 1 agents hold the debt. This concentrated holding of debt is essential for the construction of the Ricardian equilibrium. It makes clear how the distribution of debt holdings matters for the equilibrium outcome.
In this Ricardian equilibrium, debt issued by regional government, such as the Patacones issued by the regional government in Argentina, are not money in the traditional sense as their creation is not associated with increases in prices. Instead, they simply represent debt, backed by future taxes.
To characterize this outcome we return to the basic optimization problems and equilibrium conditions.
The first order condition for the representative young agent in region i is given by (3) with g 1 = g > 0 and
There are two important differences between this equilibrium and the one with monetization. First, there is taxation of old agents in region 1: τ 1 > 0. Second, the money supply is constant and thus there is no inflation tax:π = 1 and R = x+λ 1+λ . In the construction of this equilibrium, we assume that only region 1 agents hold regional debt:
Further, we conjecture (and prove in Proposition 2) that
There is a money market clearing condition that is analogous to (8) . This condition will determine the (constant) price level given the fixed money supply and the storage decisions of the agents.
To argue that there is an equilibrium with regional taxation and no monetization by the CB, we need to check the incentives for the levels of the government and private agents. This is done formally in Proposition 2; we bring out the intuition here.
We start in the sub-game where the regional government has decided not to tax and the CB must choose to monetize the debt or allow default. This is a deviation from the equilibrium we are trying to construct.
Social welfare under a CB bail-out is
where (k i * , b i * ) are obtained from (2) along the candidate Ricardian equilibrium path. 18 Hereπ is again the inverse of the inflation rate and inflation is caused by the monetization of the debt by the CB. If the central bank does not bail-out and there is a default, then social welfare is given by 1 8 We are evaluating the deviation of the CB at the savings levels of the agent's in the candidate Ricardian equilibrium with π = 1 and R = 
so agents avoid the inflation tax but only get a return on their storage and money holdings.
Proposition 2 For any κ > 0, there exists a steady state equilibrium given B * in which the regional debt is held only by region 1 agents and the region 1 government chooses to raise taxes to pay its obligations.
Proof. First, we show there exists a (k 1 * , s 1 * , k 2 * , s 2 * ,π * ) which satisfies the conditions for a stationary monetary equilibrium. Second, we check the incentives of the regional and central authorities.
In the steady state, the level of region 1 transfers to each young agent is g * , the per capita debt in the whole economy is B * , with all of it held by region 1 agents in the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2. By the budget constraint of region 1, B * = ∆g * and taxes in old age are given by ∆τ 1 = R * B * so that
The debt held by each agent in region 1 is b 1 * where ∆b 1 * = B * and region 2 agents do not hold any debt.
In equilibrium, the saving decisions of the agents, in regions i = 1, 2, are given by
where
* /∆ and b 2 * = 0 satisfy the first order conditions. Thus the equilibrium level of per capita storage k * satisfies
Given the strict concavity of u(·) and v(·), and ω y sufficiently larger than ω o , there exists a unique k * ≥ 0 which solves this condition.
We now turn to the incentives of the central bank. We argue that if the region does not set taxes to pay its debt obligation, then the central bank will not monetize. To see why, from (20) and k 1 * = k 2 * , the consumption levels of agents are equal if the CB allows a default. However, the allocation under monetization provides greater consumption for region 1 agents since they bear only a fraction of the inflation tax and receive full repayment of their debt.
Yet, the aggregate consumption of the old is the same, regardless of default or monetization. Under default, aggregate consumption of the old agents is
Under monetization, total consumption is
15 where the rate of inflation is determined from the money creation needed to finance the bail-out as in (10) .
Thus if the monetary authority deviates and bails-out the region, the resulting inflation cancels out the last two terms in (24). Hence aggregate consumption is the same regardless of default or bail-out. 19 Since a bail-out leads to a less equitable consumption distribution, the CB will prefer default to monetization.
Given that the CB will not monetize the debt, the region 1 government will tax rather than default. This allows it to avoid the default penalty, κ. Under both regional taxation and default, the consumption of the region 1 old is given by ω o + k * (x + λ).
The proof of Proposition 2 shows that W d > W b . This reflects two factors which were present in the proof of Proposition 1 as well. First, the actual resources available to distribute to the old agents is the same regardless of the action of the central bank. Second, the central bank wishes to obtain the most equitable distribution of consumption across the old agents since v(·) is strictly concave. This is achieved under default
Anticipating this, the region 1 government prefers to raise taxes rather than default. Interestingly, in both cases, the consumption of region 1 old agents is the same. Intuitively, the taxes they pay to their regional government are used to pay-off the debt which they hold. But, by taxing, the region 1 government can avoid the default cost.
Multiple Active Regions
We informally consider the situation where each of the two regions makes a favorable transfer to its agents, hoping to shift the debt burden to the central bank. It might appear that the ex-post incentive for consumption equality by the central bank will no longer motivate a bail-out once both regions issue debt. If so, then such symmetric regional behavior could, by itself, eliminate the free riding problem. However, the central bank's choice of a bail-out or allowing default is considered region by region, depending on the move made by that region, holding the other region's decision fixed. Consequently, profligate behavior of both regions will not necessarily eliminate the free riding problem.
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Suppose, for instance that both regions made a transfer in period 1. Consider the case where region 1 debt is held by agents in both regions while region 2 debt is held only by region 2 agents. Using the results above, it is easy to construct an equilibrium in which the CB is induced to bailout the debt of region 1 while the debt obligations of region 2 are met by regional taxation. In this case, the outcome combines aspects of 1 9 This result could have been anticipated in a stationary monetary equilibrium, where the real money balances of young agents, which finance the returns on old agents money holdings, are invariant to default or bail-out on debt held by the previous generation. 2 0 We are grateful to Eddie Dekel for prompting discussion of this point.
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both the monetization and the Ricardian equilibria.
Choice of B *
The equilibria described in the previous section take the steady state level of region 1 transfers, g, and thus the debt needed to finance it, B * , as given. We now explore the determination of this level of debt. Let V (B) be the welfare of a region 1 agent if the stock of debt is B. In the Ricardian equilibrium, the choice of B is, by construction, irrelevant for the welfare of region 1 agents. But in the monetization equilibrium, this is not the case. If one takes the perspective that the equilibrium will be determined by a sunspot process, then V (B) places some weight on the monetization equilibrium and the remaining probability on the Ricardian equilibrium. 22 Since welfare of region 1 agents is independent of B in the Ricardian equilibrium, the only effect of B occurs when the monetization equilibrium is selected. Thus we focus our discussion of the choice of B assuming the selection of the monetization equilibrium.
So consider
This is the level of lifetime expected utility for a representative region 1 agent in an equilibrium with monetization. Here B is the level of debt per capita so that B ∆ is the level of debt, and thus the transfer, per young region 1 agent. The functionR(B) is the return on savings if the stock of debt is B from the equilibrium with monetization, as in (10) . Our main result is that the region 1 government will prefer a positive level of transfers given the positive probability that the central bank will monetize this obligation.
Proposition 3
The solution to (25) entails B * > 0. Proof.
Using the envelope condition and region 1 agents' optimal choice of s given B andR(B), the optimal choice of B by the region 1 government satisfies
To show V ′ (0) > 0, we view bothR andπ as functions of B, usingR = x+λπ 1+λ and (10) rewritten as
Taking derivatives to calculateR ′ (B), and evaluating that derivative at B = 0, whereπ = 1, yields
Substituting this into (26), recalling that with no debt issued
Since k 1 =k in a symmetric steady state with B = 0, V ′ (0) is positive when ∆ < 1. Thus the optimal policy of the region 1 government will entail a positive level of B.
Policy Implications
The two steady state equilibria characterized above have very different welfare implications for agents in the two regions. Agents in region 1 strictly prefer the monetization equilibrium while those in region 2 prefer the equilibrium with regional taxation. Thus, as indicated by Proposition 3, the RG will increase the level of B above zero and will try to support the equilibrium with monetization. In contrast, agents in region 2 would act to limit region 1 and eliminate the monetization equilibrium. We consider policy measures, either proposed or effectively implemented, from the perspective of these two groups of agents. These policies can also be viewed as devices for supporting the planner's solution.
A commitment by the central bank not to bailout any regional government would of course eliminate the monetization equilibrium. The Ricardian equilibrium would be the sole equilibrium and the social optimum.
In this equilibrium, the level of government debt would be irrelevant. discussed as a remedy for a weak CB. Motivated by these experiences, we discuss restrictions on debt and dollarization as a substitute for CB commitment not to monetize debt.
Restrictions on debt
We consider two types of restrictions. The first restriction is a debt limit. If B * is forced to be zero, then there is no monetization. Clearly a restriction of this form would be favored by region 2 agents.
Within Argentina, there have been numerous attempts to place limits on regional debt. But, not surprisingly, not all regions are in favor of these limits. Interestingly, recent negotiations with the International
Monetary Fund have included a discussion of the regional fiscal situation. 23 As far as the Stability and Growth Pact is concerned, many critics claim that the focus on actual deficits was ill-conceived and suggest that limits be imposed on national public debts. Clearly though these limits are not costless since efficiency often dictates that government's run deficits for tax smoothing reasons.
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The second restriction is on the holding of debt. Suppose there is a capital control which makes it prohibitively expensive for a private agent in region 2 or a financial intermediary intervening on his behalf to hold region 1 debt. This intervention implies that monetization is no longer a steady state and makes the Ricardian equilibrium the only steady state equilibrium. It is in the interest of region 2 agents. Such restrictions on the holding of debt emulate a commitment device ruling out monetization.
In Argentina, the small-denomination debt of the Buenos Aires region, the so-called Patacones, issued in July 2002 allowed for the repayment of public obligations using these notes. But no other regions appeared willing to accept these notes for payment of taxes. While this is not a policy that prohibits Patacones to be held outside of the Buenos Aires region, this policy clearly reduces their attractiveness for residents of other regions.
Dollarization
There is a more drastic measure to avoid the monetization of regional debt which has been widely discussed both by policymakers and economists: dollarization. This entails the complete surrender of monetary sovereignty, say by Argentina to the U.S., and not just restrictions on the supply of money. Clearly dollarization eliminates the possibility of monetization by the Argentine central bank. Put differently, the delegation of monetary authority under a dollarization regime provides a type of commitment to a weak CB in a multi- 2 3 Details are available on the recent agreement between the IMF and Argentina, http://www.mecon.gov.ar. 2 4 The tradeoff between tax smoothing and bailout incentives arising from fiscal restrictions in a fiscal federation is the focus To study these issues we consider a world economy formed of two countries, the U.S. and Argentina. If the dollar is used in both countries, the world economy is described by the model we used before. Under dollarization, the inflation rate is common to both countries and is set by the U.S. central bank, the FED.
Crucially the objective of the Fed is the utility of the representative U.S. household: here the use of common currency does not imply a political union. This is in marked contrast to what was assumed as the objective of the monetary union's central bank in the previous section.
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With this model, we find that the Ricardian equilibrium disappears leaving only a monetization equilibrium. Formally,
Proposition 4
Under dollarization, for a given value of B * , there exists a monetization equilibrium for θ sufficiently close to 1. There is no Ricardian equilibrium.
Proof.
To characterize the monetarization equilibrium, we check the incentives of the U.S. Treasury and the FED. The FED takes into consideration the utility of region 1 (American) old agents only. Hence 2 5 Exactly how this is done within the U.S. is an open question, but for now we assume that the central U.S. government has adequate commitment relative to its states. 2 6 In other words, the Fed's objective is given by (6) with ∆ = 1.
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the FED's choice of default or bail-out depends only on the consumption of region 1 agents in these two outcomes. As in (14) , the consumption level of U.S. citizens under a monetized bail-out is
and by (16) for i = 1 under default:c
The FED will choose to monetize rather than default iff c o1 * >c o1 . From the above expressions:
Sincek * ≡ ∆k 1 * + (1 − ∆)k 2 * , this inequality holds strictly for θ = 1. By continuity, the inequality in (32)
holds for θ near 1.
Therefore when θ, the fraction of debt held by U.S. residents, is sufficiently large, the FED will monetize the U.S. debt. This is preferred by the Treasury since the difference in consumption level under bail-out exceeds that under taxation of U.S. citizens, as in (18). Thus for θ near 1, there is a monetization equilibrium.
In a Ricardian equilibrium, agents in region 1 anticipate future taxes and thus
∆ . As both the U.S. Treasury and the FED have the same objective of maximizing the consumption of old U.S. agents, the outcome of the game played each period will provide to U.S. agents the maximal consumption level.
In a Ricardian equilibrium, the U.S. Treasury levies a tax on U.S. citizens so that the consumption of a region 1 old agent is:ĉ
Suppose instead that the U.S. Treasury does not levy the tax. The consumption levels under a bailout (viewed as a defection for a candidate Ricardian equilibrium) and a default are given in (30) and (31), respectively, where the values of k i * in these expressions are evaluated in the candidate Ricardian equilibrium.
Comparing (33) and (30), bail-out dominates regional taxation for region 1, c o1 ≥ĉ o1 , since default: if θ is high enough, default would represent a high cost for region 1's old agents which are the sole concern of the FED. On the contrary, if θ is low, representing a significant holding by region 2 of region 1's debt, a regional default may NOT be bailed out at all.
We find also that dollarization indeed will induce a monetization equilibrium if a sufficiently large fraction of the debt is held in the U.S. In this case, the FED may be induced to bail-out the U.S. government, and in doing so tax Argentine citizens who hold dollars. In other words, dollarization does not eliminate the incentives for monetization.
Again, the issue of debt distribution is crucial for the existence of such an equilibrium in this economy.
The relative gain of a bail-out over default from the FED's perspective depends on the relative inflation tax burden on U.S. residents. The more Argentine residents hold dollars, the more they bear of the inflation tax.
The demand for money is proportional to the amount of capital held by Argentine residents. Therefore the higher is θ, the smaller is the share of capital held by U.S. citizens and the larger is the inflation tax borne by Argentina.
Clearly this is a cost of dollarization for Argentine citizens, since they bear not only any Argentine taxes to finance their own public goods, but also the inflation tax for the benefit of U.S. citizens. Cooper and Kempf (2001) discuss the implications of a treaty between the U.S. and Argentina as an incentive device on the U.S. central bank to limit the inflation tax.
Note that we obtained the opposite result than that of the previous section. There, the monetary authority, caring about equalizing consumption among regions, chooses the best way to redistribute from region 1 to region 2. In the case of dollarization, as the FED cares only about the U.S. welfare, it chooses the best way to redistribute from region 2 (identified to Argentina) to region 1 (identified with the U.S.).
This result stands in contrast to that in Proposition 2 in which there was an isolated Ricardian equilibrium in which region 1 agents held all of that debt. In that equilibrium, the central bank prefers default to a bail-out since the allocation under a default was equal across old agents in the two regions. But, under dollarization, the objective of the FED coincides with the U.S. Treasury and so the payment of taxes by U.S.
citizens is dominated by either a bail-out or a default.
In effect, dollarization solves the multiplicity of monetary equilibria but by eliminating the virtuous one!
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to determine the impact of issuing debt by a regional government in a monetary union. Recent events in Argentina, (the issue and circulation of small denomination bonds by some provinces, 22 such as the Patacones), and in Europe, (the de facto demise of the Stability and Growth Pact at the end of 2003), prove the necessity of a better understanding of how "soft" is regional debt in monetary unions.
Two leading views are relevant: (i) the debt is just a claim on future tax revenues and (ii) the debt is "like" money; issuing it is tantamount to the printing of fiat money and is inflationary.
Our analysis indicates that both interpretations are consistent with an equilibrium of our monetary model.
The multiplicity reflects a commitment problem on the part of the central bank. Without commitment, the central bank will ex post always redistribute consumption to achieve greater equality in consumption across different regions. Depending on the distribution of the holding of the regional government debt, this desire for redistribution may lead the central bank to bailout a region or it may lead the central bank to allow default. In equilibrium, the distribution of the holdings of regional governments' debt has powerful effects on the incentives for the central bank. The more even is this distribution, the more likely it is that the central bank will prefer a bail-out to a costly default. Debt holding is arbitrary since in equilibrium savers are indifferent between holding bonds or storage.
The creation of a secondary market would amount to a change in the distribution of bonds but not to the suppression of the multiplicity of equilibria, since it does not break the savers' indifference and introduce a wedge between storage and bonds. In other words, the introduction of a secondary market would not change our results as in equilibrium there is no default. Hence there is no scope for discounting debt and no trade opportunity.
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The commitment problem of the central bank has some important incentive effects on the regions. A bailout creates a free-rider problem in that regional governments will have an incentive to run inefficiently large deficits in anticipation of the central bank's monetization of its debt. 28 Not surprisingly, other agents in the economy will have an incentive to erect impediments to this free-rider problem including: debt restrictions, limits on the holding of debt by other regions and even dollarization.
The analysis did not require that the regional debt be small denomination. Nonetheless the paper does 2 7 Broner, Martina and Ventura (2007), studying the related subject of sovereign risk, have shown that the introduction of secondary markets allows to obtain a unique equilibrium with debt.. However their model differs much from ours. In particular, there is no lender of last resort. In addition, there is a multiplicity of bond issuers: the issuers of bonds are private agents, living in the "debtor" country and not its government. They individually have an incentive to buy back bonds from the savers living in the sovereign "creditor" contry. This leads to a prisoner's dilemma, which ends up with an equilibrium where all the debts issued by "debtor" agents and sold to "creditor" agents are bought back by "debtor" agents on the secondary market.
Such a non-cooperative behaviour between debtors is impossible in our model where there is a unique issuer of bonds. 
